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[Abstract] This paper examines the strategic convergence between Russia and China. Strategic 
convergence is understood as the overlap of key objectives and interests with regard to long-term 
developments in world politics, which provides the basis for extensive tactical co-operation 
between two or more states. The paper focuses on the compatibility of Russia and China in 
terms of complementary economies, location and political outlook. The match between Russian 
natural resources and Chinese markets is examined in particular. The paper concludes that a 
closer relationship between the two countries in many ways would be of mutual advantage, 
but that it is far from certain that an alliance will develop.
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1. Introduction 
 
Russia is the world’s second largest oil producer, after Saudi Arabia,1 and 
China the world’s second largest energy consumer, after the United States.2 
While bilateral trade-flows are still small, there is great potential inherent in 
the relationship. Old hostilities have been put aside after the final settlement 
in 2004 of a series of disputes along the 3645-km border which had plagued 
Sino–Russo relations for centuries and caused war in 1969.3 Moreover, Bei-
jing and Moscow have compatible views on separatism, Islamism, terrorism, 
democratisation and stability. Neo-conservative American commentators 
such as Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation have argued that the Sino–
Russian relationship undercuts US global interests ‘on an unprecedented 
scale.’4 This paper explores whether the strategic convergence is sufficiently 
strong for the two states to set aside their differences, and build a sustainable 
partnership. The paper aims for as neutral a stance as possible, neither cheer-
ing on nor condemning cooperation between China and Russia. In stead it 
aims to provide a simple assessment of the scope for closer cooperation be-
tween the two countries on the basis of strategic convergence. 
‘Strategic convergence’ is here defined as the overlap of key objectives 
and interests with regard to long-term developments in world politics, which 
provides the basis for extensive tactical co-operation between two or more 
                                                     
1   Russia had an output of 9.5 million barrels per day in 2005, the most recent year for 
which figures are available, compared to Saudi Arabia’s output of 11.1 million barrels per 
day. Energy Information Administration, Top World Oil Producers 2005. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables1_2.html  
2  Production and consumption of coal, China’s main fuel, is the highest in the world. China 
passed Japan as the second largest consumer of petroleum in 2003. Energy Information 
Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics, and Analysis: Oil Gas, Electricity and 
Coal, Washington DC, August 2006, p.2. Throughout this paper, data for China refer to 
mainland China, excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan, unless otherwise noted. 
3  Most of the border had been agreed upon when Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in 1991. 
Valdimir Paramonov i Aleksey Strokov, Otnosheniya mezhdu Rossiey i Kitaem: Istoria, 
sovremennost i budushchee, CSRC Occasional Paper, 2006, p.5 
4  Peter Brookes, ‘Sino–Russian Strategic Romance’, Military.com, 27 March 2006. 
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states.5 To examine strategic convergence between China and Russia we 
analyse material as well as ideational factors. By ‘material factors’ we mean 
physical and economic aspects, with the emphasis on complementary 
economies, geography and technology. At the level of specific resources, the 
focus is on oil and gas, but other non-renewable extractables like wood and 
food are also included. By ‘ideational factors’ we refer to ideology and val-
ues with focus on views of separatism, Islamic radicalism, terrorism, democ-
racy and US hegemony. The ideational level of analysis, in particular, bene-
fits from the authors’ ability to access primary sources in both Chinese and 
Russian. This makes the analysis distinct from several other papers on re-
lated topics, many of which are written by scholars who at best know one of 
the languages. 
 
 
                                                     
5  Gary Hamel, Leading the Revolution, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 
2000) employed the term ‘strategic convergence’ to refer to the limited scope of strategies 
used by rivals in different circumstances. He argued that strategies converged more than 
they ought to because strategies which are successful in certain contexts get imitated in 
other contexts by agents that do not understand the need to design custom strategies for 
different situations. This is not the sense in which the term is employed here.  
2. Complementary economies 
 
China’s dependence on Russian oil and gas 
 
The new Sino–Russian relationship is driven by trade and mutual economic 
interest. China’s economy is the fourth largest in the world, with a gross do-
mestic product of USD 2.8 trillion;6 in terms of purchasing power parity it is 
the second largest, with an output of USD 8.6 trillion dollars.7 China has 
pursued a dual transition process, moving simultaneously from a planned 
economy to a market economy and from a rural, agrarian economy to a more 
urban, industrial one. In this process it has emerged as the world’s second 
largest consumer of oil products at 7.4 million barrels per day,8 a figure pro-
jected to at least double to 13.4 million barrels per day by 2025.9 Around 40 
per cent of growth in world oil demand between 2001 and 2005 came from 
China.10  
Russia provided 10.1 per cent of China’s total oil imports in 2005. This 
amounted to 257,000 barrels per day, and was up from 29,700 barrels in 
2000.11 However, this figure is set to increase steeply, in particular if Rus-
sia’s oil can provide China with a more secure foundation for its economic 
transformation than supplies from volatile Middle Eastern and African 
states. Energy reserves in western Siberia are estimated at up to 200bn bar-
rels, and those in eastern Siberia 50bn barrels. In the Sakhalin region there 
could be 28bn barrels. For comparative purposes, Iraq is thought to hold 
112.5bn barrels.12 Rising global temperatures will in the future make it eas-
ier for Russia to access these resources.13 
                                                     
6  Total GDP 2005, World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, July 2006, p.1. 
China is likely to overtake Germany as the world’s third largest economy by the end of 
the decade.  
7  PPP GDP 2005, World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, July 
2006, p.1. This is only USD 3.8 billion behind the United States.  
8  2006 Estimate. Energy Information Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics, and 
Analysis: Oil Gas, Electricity and Coal, Washington DC, August 2006, p.2. 
9  Wayne Morrison, China’s Economic Conditions, CRS Brief for Congress, 15 May 2006, 
p.16. The International Energy Agency projects that China’s oil imports will surge from 
around 2 mb/d in 2003 to more than 10 mb/d in 2030, equal to over 74 per cent of ex-
pected domestic demand. See Faith Birol, ‘China Presentation’, World Energy Outlook 
2004 (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2004), p.23. China’s reliance on imported oil 
was slightly down in 2005, but this trend is unlikely to continue. See People’s Daily, 
‘China’s Dependence on Imported Oil Down 2.2 Percentage Points in 2005’, 13 January  
2006. 
10  Morrison, China’s Economic Conditions, p.16 
11  Tian Chunrong, ‘Analysis of China's Oil Import and Export in 2005’ (2005 nian zhong-
guo shiyou jinchukou zhuangkuang fenxi),  International Petroleum Economics (Guoji 
Shiyou Jingji), Vol. 14, No.3, 2006, p.4. 
12  See Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev, ‘China, Japan and the Scramble for Siberia’, 
Survival, Vol.48, No.1,  Spring 2006, p.176. 
13, ‘Comrade Climate Change: Rising Global Temperatures is Good for Russia’, Econo-
mist.com, 18 December 2006. 
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Geography in the form of the shared Sino–Russian border has a crucial 
impact on the potential for trade between the two countries. For China, the 
strategic importance of access to Russian raw materials is great, because 
other assets are largely dependent on open waterways, in particular the 
straights of Hormuz and Malacca. These could be cut off in the event of a 
crisis over Taiwan or other major confrontation with the USA. Moreover, 
conflicts not directly related to China and beyond its control could result in 
supply disruption, for example a confrontation between Iran and the USA. 
Iran currently supplies 11.2 per cent of China’s total imports and the Middle 
East as a whole supplies 47.2 per cent of total oil imports.14 China sources 
30.3 per cent of its total petroleum imports from Africa.15 A crisis in these 
regions would have severe consequences for Beijing. By contrast, Russian 
supplies can arrive in China through their shared border or the Pacific, and 
therefore carry a different risk profile.  
 
Russian raw materials to avoid confrontation with the West 
 
Chinese imports of raw materials from conflict-ridden countries in Africa, 
the Middle East, Latin America and Asia lead to accusations from Washing-
ton that China is propping up unsavoury regimes and failing to act as respon-
sible member of the international community. This argument carries some 
weight, given that approximately 60 per cent of Sudan’s oil output is sold to 
China,16 and 5.2 per cent of China’s imported oil comes from Sudan.17 
China has consistently refused to allow the passing of a Security Council 
resolution which would mandate UN forces to the Darfur region. Consider-
able concern arose in Washington after Venezuela, the world’s fifth largest 
oil exporter, led by left-wing president Hugo Chavez, offered Chinese firms 
operating rights to mature oil fields.18 China also has established a strong 
presence in Myanmar and in Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.  
While such developments are often interpreted as part of a strategy to 
support what Washington considers ‘rogue states,’ they are not so much an 
ideologically motivated challenge to the United States as a reflection of 
China’s rising demand for imported raw materials, and a series of pragmatic 
decisions to channel Chinese investment to states where there is little compe-
tition from American and European corporations. China seeks to expand 
                                                     
http://www.economist.com/daily/columns/greenview/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8443195
&fsrc=nwl  
14  Tian Chunrong, ‘Analysis of China's Oil Import and Export in 2005’ (2005 nian zhong-
guo shiyou jinchukou zhuangkuang fenxi),  International Petroleum Economics (Guoji 
Shiyou Jingji), Vol. 14, No.3, 2006, p.4.  
15  The leading suppliers are Angola (13.7 per cent ), Sudan (5.2 per cent), Congo (4.4 per 
cent) and Equatorial Guinea (3.0 per cent). (Tian Chunrong 2006, above.) 
16  Drew Thompson, ‘Disaccord on Sudan Could Poison China–US Ties’, International Her-
ald Tribune, 18 November 2004. 
17  Tian Chunrong 2006 (see note 14 above). 
18  Mary Hennock, ‘China’s Global Hunt for Oil’, BBC News, March 9, 2005. 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/business/4191683.stm  
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control over supplies of petroleum, minerals and other raw materials through 
equity investments primarily for reasons of state and economic security.  
This strategy has in a sense been encouraged by Washington, because it 
has sought to block Chinese bids for less controversial assets, such as 
CNOOC’s USD 18.5bn attempted takeover of Unocal,19 on the grounds that 
China should not be allowed to take over ‘American’ resources. In fact, 
Unocal’s assets are not, strictly speaking, American: most of them are lo-
cated in Asia, an important reason why Unocal was attractive to China. In a 
context where Beijing is criticised for collaborating with African and Middle 
Eastern states with little Western presence, while it struggles to gain access 
to raw materials in more stable areas, China has strong incentives to increase 
imports from Russia, even though the current political climate in Russia 
makes it unlikely that China will be allowed to make large equity invest-
ments. On the other hand, in June 2006 Sinopec was able to acquire a 97 per 
cent stake in Udmurtneft, a medium-sized unit of BP’s Russia vehicle TNK-
BP, for $3.5 billion.20 
 
Chinese-Russian-Japanese energy cooperation: Three’s a crowd  
 
Whether Moscow favours Beijing or Tokyo in the construction of energy 
transport infrastructure in Siberia will have important implications for the 
balance of power in East Asia. If China wins, this will both support China’s 
claim to regional pre-eminence and promote the Russia–China axis; if Japan 
were to succeed, a more multi-polar structure would emerge in East Asia. 
The Kremlin’s hesitation on the matter is one indication of the geopolitical 
implications of the choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2004 Japan seemed to emerge as the core partner for Russia in the con-
struction of Siberian energy infrastructure, after Beijing had earlier appeared 
to be Moscow’s favourite. Tokyo was willing to guarantee financing for the 
project, possibly in the range of USD 15bn. The pipeline to Nakhodka, on 
Russia’s Pacific coast, would be the longest in the world: at around 4,180km, 
                                                     
19  Paul Blustein, ‘Many Oil Experts Unconcerned Over China Unocal Bid’, Washington 
Post, 1 July 2005, p. D01 
20  Energy Information Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics, and Analysis: Oil 
Gas, Electricity and Coal, Washington DC, August 2006, p.5 
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it would be three times the length of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.21 The pipe-
line terminus would be just one day away by tanker from Japan.  
Putin had reasons to favour the Nakhodka pipeline, because Japan’s deal 
promised greater net investment in Russia and because a pipeline to the Pa-
cific would make Russia less dependent on China as a customer for its sales. 
Russia is concerned about monopsony, a situation in which there is only one 
buyer but many potential sellers – a concern further reinforced after the con-
struction of a pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang in Western China was 
finished in 2006. 
However, the core reason why China fell out of favour in 2004 was the 
role that Yukos had played in exporting oil to China. Putin was displeased 
by Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s political ambitions and his plans for privately 
controlled export routes for Russian petroleum products. Both in the in Mur-
mansk and the Far East, Yukos seemed poised to play an influential role. 
The Yukos affair is an indication that internal dynamics in Russia can be 
extremely important to foreign policy outcomes. While the episode was un-
fortunate from Beijing’s point of view, China has been careful not to criticise 
what it regards as an internal affair of Moscow.22 
The pipeline to Nakhodka is yet to be built, and at present there is no fi-
nal decision as to whether it will be. However, Russia appears to have de-
cided to build a pipeline to Skovorodino only 70km from the Chinese border, 
scheduled for completion in the second half of 2008.23 This is set to include 
a spur to Daqing, and carry as much as 600,000 barrels a day.24 The con-
struction of the pipeline to Skovorodino strengthens China–Russia relations, 
while simultaneously giving the Kremlin the option of extending the pipeline 
to Nakhodka. This allows Russia to maintain leverage over China and Japan. 
The territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands north of Hokkaido contin-
ues to plague relations between Japan and Russia, which have yet to sign a 
peace treaty to end the Second World War. If there is no agreement on the 
issue, the pipeline to Nakhodka may not move beyond the planning board. 
The shooting dead of a Japanese crab fisherman in Russian-controlled waters 
near Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido in August 2006 is one example of 
                                                     
21  Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev, ‘China, Japan and the Scramble for Siberia’, Sur-
vival, Vol.48, No.1, Spring 2006, p.170. 
22  As central tenet of China’s foreign policy is that it shall not intervene in the domestic 
affairs of other states, it is hardly imaginable that Chinese politicians would comment 
openly on the Yukos affair. However, Chinese scholars have expressed opinions – see for 
example You Fang, ‘Yukos: Swept Away’ (‘Youkesi: liushui luohua chun quye’), China 
Oil and Petrochemical Fortnightly (Zhongguo shiyou shihua banyuekan), No.16, 15 Au-
gust, 2006, pp.24–25; Feng Yujun, ‘Firm Strategy for Right of Control of Natural Re-
sources: Analysis of Russia’s ‘Yukos Incident’’ (‘Laolao zhangwo zhanlue ziyuan 
kongzhiquan: Eluosi ‘Youkesi shijian’ pouxi’, International Trade (Guoji maoyi), No.9, 
2004, pp. 32–33; Qu Wenyi, ‘What the Yukos Incident Says About the Putin's Govern-
ment Economic Policies Towards Oligarchs’ (‘Cong Youkesi shijian kan Pujing zhengfu 
dui guatou jingji de zhili’), World Economics (Shijie jingji), No.3, 2004, pp.34–37. 
23  Transneft, ‘CNPC are satisfied with starting of ESPO pipeline construction from Skovo-
rodino’ 30 May 2006, 
http://www.transneft.ru/press/Default.asp?LANG=EN&ATYPE=8&PG=7&ID=11039.  
24  Energy Information Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics, and Analysis: Oil 
Gas, Electricity and Coal, Washington DC, August 2006, p.5. 
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the scope for worsening of this conflict.25 If Tokyo is unable to settle its ter-
ritorial dispute with Russia, and Beijing–Moscow relations remain good, 
Moscow may conclude that it has more to gain by constructing an additional 
pipeline to China. China, after all, is a market enjoying strong growth, and is 
unlikely to jeopardise future energy security by demanding renegotiation of 
price agreements once the pipeline has been built.  
Natural gas co-operation in the massive Kovykta field, and perhaps Sak-
halin, are likely elements in future Chinese–Russian energy co-operation. In 
April 2006 President Putin and Hu Jintao reportedly agreed on the construc-
tion of a pipeline from Kovykta to China and possibly South Korea, at an 
estimated cost of USD 12bn.26 However, no formal decision on the project 
has been announced. Meanwhile there have been significant increases in rail 
shipments of oil to China and a commitment to increase these further. 
Heilongjiang has been importing electricity from Russian hydroelectric 
power stations since 2004, and plans to import 18 billion kilowatt hours by 
2010.27 Sales to China decrease Russia’s dependence on the European mar-
ket and partially strengthen the Russian argument that it can turn to others if 
Brussels does not accept Moscow’s conditions. China’s energy consumption 
is predicted to surge from 1,675 TWh in 2002 to 5,573 TWh in 2030.28 
 
Other extractable commodities 
 
The natural resources that Russia has and that China needs, extend far be-
yond the energy sector. China is already the world’s largest consumer of 
steel, cement and copper;29 and while Russia and Central Asia currently ac-
count for only about 6 per cent of China’s total supply of raw material im-
ports, this is likely to change.30 As the factbox below shows, Russia has a 
strong position in the global supply of many strategic non-ferrous metals 
necessary for the type of industrial production at the core of China’s strategy 
for continued economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
25  David Pilling. ‘Japan–Russia Territorial Dispute Escalates’, Financial Times, 16 August 
2006. 
26  Energy Information Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics, and Analysis: Oil 
Gas, Electricity and Coal, Washington DC, August 2006, pp.9–10. 
27  ‘China Imports Electricity from Russia’, People’s Daily, 5  May 2004; Yang Li, ‘Electric-
ity Trade Flourishes’, Xinhua, 23 March 2006. 
28  Faith Birol, ‘China Presentation’ World Energy Outlook 2004 (Paris: International Energy 
Agency, 2004), p.24. 
29  Wayne Morrison, China’s Economic Conditions, CRS Brief for Congress, 15 May 2006, 
p.16. 
30  Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev, ‘China, Japan and the Scramble for Siberia’, Sur-
vival, Vol.48, No.1, Spring 2006, p.167. 
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Factbox on Russian natural resources 
 
ALUMINIUM 
Russia's biggest aluminium producer Rusal will buy up its closest rival Sual to create the world's number one alumin-
ium firm, with output of 4 million tonnes per year. 
 
NICKEL 
Russia's Norilsk Nickel is the world’s major producer of nickel, a vital ingredient in the production of stainless steel. 
Output was 243,000 tonnes in 2005. Compatriot miner Ufaley produced 10,701 tonnes of nickel. 
 
TITANIUM 
VSMPO-Avisma is the world's biggest supplier of titanium. It supplies 40-45 per cent of the titanium products used 
by Boeing and has won 60–70 per cent of titanium supply contracts for Airbus between 2008 and 2013. 
 
PALLADIUM 
Russia's Norilsk Nickel is the world's number one palladium producer, with 3.1 million ounces in 2005. 
 
PLATINUM 
Russia produced an estimated 27,000 kg of platinum in 2005, putting it in second place behind South Africa. 
 
VANADIUM 
In 2005, Russia produced an estimated 9,000 tonnes of the hardening alloy vanadium, used in oil pipes, making it 
number four in the world, after South Africa, the United States and China. The Russian steel producer Evraz has 
since announced plans to buy a majority stake in the US producer Stratcor, and 24.9 per cent of South Africa's High-
veld Steel and Vanadium, which would make it world number one. 
 
MAGNESIUM 
Russia is the world's third largest supplier of magnesium, after China and Canada. VSMPO Avisma produced 19,000 
tonnes of magnesium in 2005 and Solikamsk 17,600 tonnes. 
 
COBALT 
Russia is the world's fifth largest producer of cobalt, widely used in aircraft engines and batteries. Norilsk Nickel 
accounts for most of this, where cobalt occurs as a by-product of nickel mining. Total mine production was 5,000 
tonnes in 2005. 
 
GOLD 
Russia is the world's fifth largest gold producer. Polyus Gold, a spin-off from Norilsk Nickel, is Russia's biggest gold 
miner. Its output in 2005 was 1.076 million ounces in 2005. 
 
COPPER 
Russia is the world's sixth-largest copper producer, with total mine production 675,000 tonnes in 2005. Both Norilsk 
Nickel and UMMC, controlled by Makhmudov, produce copper. 
 
COAL 
Russia has the world's second biggest coal reserves, after the United States. It holds 17.3 per cent of the world’s 
proven coal reserves. 
 
 
(Data from Reuters, BP Statistical Review 2006, US Energy Information Administration, Norilsk Nickel company 
website, United States Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries 2006.  
http://cn.today.reuters.com/stocks/FinanceArticle.aspx?view=CN&symbol=HK1q.L&storyid=155589+30-Aug-
2006+RTRS. Posted 30 Aug. 2006, downloaded 21 Nov. 2006.) 
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Food 
 
Another area where China and Russia may come to work together more 
closely is agriculture. Arable land covers approximately 13 per cent or 122 
million hectares of China’s territory, which amounts to only 0.27 hectares 
per capita. This is less than 40 per cent of the world average, and half the 
level in India.31 As China industrialises and urbanises, while also seeking to 
convert lower-quality arable lands into grasslands or forest to prevent deser-
tification, arable land is becoming increasingly scarce. Between 1996 and 
2005, China lost approximately 8 million hectares or 6.6 per cent of its ar-
able land.32 Between 1999 and 2003 grain production dropped continuously; 
although the situation has since improved somewhat, China faces a shortfall 
of nearly 20 million tons by 2010.33 Adding to the difficult situation, one-
sixth of China’s total arable lands are polluted by heavy metals.34  
Self-sufficiency is a strategic priority for Beijing, and the government has 
tightened control over land conversion for construction purposes. However, 
there is little that can be done without undermining the economic growth that 
is the source of political legitimacy for the Communist Party. Beijing, there-
fore, appears to acknowledge that it will have to import food, and in this 
context Russia is a natural partner. Guo Binqi, for example, suggests that 
‘Russia in the near future could become China’s granary.’35 While Russia’s 
cultivated land currently comprises only 7.17 per cent of its territory,36 55 
per cent of the world’s black earth (chernozem) is located in Russia and there 
is clearly much more which could be put to agricultural use.37 Thus Russia 
has the potential for a massive increase in grain production through the ap-
plication of modern technology and improved organisation of its agricultural 
sector. Unlike most other countries, Russia’s agricultural sector may stand to 
benefit from global warming.38 
 
                                                     
31  Yingling Liu, ‘Shrinking Arable Lands Jeopardizing China's Food Security’, Worldwatch 
Institue, 18 April 2006. http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3912 
32  Beijing News (Xinjingbao), Ministry of Land and Resources Reports China Lost 122 
Million Hectares of Arable Land Over the Last Ten Years (Guotu ziyuanbu baogao xian-
shi, zhongguo shi nian gengdi jianshao 1.2 yi mu], Xinhuanet, 16 March 2006 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2006-03/16/content_4308627.htm 
33  China Agricultural Net (Zhongguo nongye wang), ‘The Eleventh Five Year Plan: How to 
Fill Grain Shortfall of 20 Million Tons’ (‘Shiyiwu’ qijian: ruhe tianbu 1000 yi jin liangshi 
quekou), 29 March 2006 http://www.zgny.com.cn/ConsHtml/5/9/4/94082.html 
34  China Agricultural Net (Zhongguo nongye wang) (see note 33 above)  
35  Guo Bin Qi, ‘The Prospects for China–Russia Agricultural Co-operation are Broad’, 
(Zhong e nongye hezuo qianjing guangkuo), Siberian Studies (Xiboliya yanjiu), Vol.30, 
No.3, June 2003, p.25. 
36  ‘Russia’, CIA World Fact Book 2006 (Washington DC, 2006). 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html  
37  ‘Rossiya prokormit milliard zelmyan’, Rossiya vybiraet, No.23, Vol.105, 14 June 2001. 
38  Natalia Reznik, ‘Globalnoye poteplenie v Rossii: Bolshe zasukhi i kartoshki’, Izvestiya, 
11 September 2004., p.1. 
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China’s growth not an economic threat to Russia 
 
China’s growing competitiveness does not represent any great threat to Rus-
sia compared with the USA and the EU. Manufacturing in the Russian Fed-
eration is weak and unlikely to recover, particularly given Russia’s new 
wealth from natural resources and the lingering risk of Dutch disease. In-
stead China’s cheap consumer goods present an opportunity to Russian con-
sumers. There has been a notable shift in China’s revealed comparative ad-
vantages, a measure used as a proxy of a country’s international competi-
tiveness,39 and China has emerged as an important exporter of technology-
based products. China produces two-thirds of all photocopiers, microwave 
ovens, DVD players; over half of all digital cameras and around two-fifths of 
personal computers40 – all of which a rapidly expanding Russian middle 
class wants. Simultaneously China’s competitiveness in labour-intensive 
products such as textiles, clothing and leather has grown.  
Low-quality apparel and footwear play a large role in China’s exports to 
Russia, but China’s export of machinery and electronics is growing. In the 
first 11 months of 2005, export of machinery and electronics to Russia grew 
70 per cent, and made up 24 per cent of China’s total exports to Russia.41 
Export of high-tech products to Russia grew 58 per cent in the same period 
and accounted for 7 per cent of China’s total exports to Russia. Because of 
income from its exports of raw materials, Russia had a current account sur-
plus of almost USD 85bn in 200542, set to be even greater in 2006. For this 
reason Russia worries less about China’s exporting power or the underval-
ued renminbi than do many other states. This means that a point of tension 
that characterises Sino–US and Sino–EU relations is not present in the Sino–
Russian relationship. China and Russia have acknowledged each other as 
market economies and China was amongst the first to conclude WTO nego-
tiations with Russia in (October 2004), indicating China’s emphasis on 
building close trade relations with Russia.43 
Russia is the world’s fourteenth largest economy, with an output of USD 
760bn, while in terms of purchasing power parity it is the world’s tenth larg-
est economy.44 It is the world’s seventh most populous state, with 143 mil-
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lion people.45 Figures from Chinese customs show that total trade volume 
between China and Russia in 2005 reached USD 29.1 billion, up 37.1 per 
cent year on year, and 14 percentage points higher than the growth rate of 
China’s total foreign trade. China is Russia’s fourth largest trade partner, but 
Russia is only China’s ninth largest export market, accounting for 1.5 per 
cent of China’s export markets.46 These figures make it reasonable to project 
that while Russia will be of growing importance to China as an export mar-
ket, its significance will remain small. It is a source of raw materials and as a 
partner in Machtpolitik that Russia is important to China.  
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3. Military convergence 
 
The USA is the silent party at the table in all China–Russia meetings, not in 
terms of pressure, but in terms of mutual interest on the part of China and 
Russia in constraining American hegemonic behaviour. Beijing’s current 
starting point is ‘one superpower, many powers’. Russia seems grudgingly to 
accept US primacy, but Putin has on numerous occasions made clear that 
Moscow would like to see a multi-polar world.47 Beijing’s current foreign 
policy discourse is centred on the ‘peaceful rise’ thesis, now re-baptised the 
‘peaceful development’ thesis so as not to frighten anyone, but the underly-
ing perspectives are in many respects similar.  
Because both Russia and China are heavily armed, including nuclear ar-
senals, there is a balance of power.48 The chance that one state could seek to 
invade the other is low (although many Russian actors do fear Chinese 
demographic and/or territorial expansionism in Siberia – see below). More-
over, both Russia and China are without significant allies. Moscow and Bei-
jing might have hoped that the Iraq War would change the Western alliance 
structures fundamentally, but this has not been the outcome.  
China and Russia have expanded military co-operation. They have been 
collaborating on foreign and military intelligence since the early 1990s, and 
in 2005 they conducted their first joint war games. The exercise included 
10,000 military, intelligence and internal security forces. Given China’s re-
luctance to enter military alliances, it was a significant gesture to allow the 
games to be staged on Chinese soil.49 Russia and China have strong incen-
tives to expand their military co-operation in a context where US military 
spending amounts to 47 per cent of world total.50 
 
Russian arms to China 
 
Russia has been China’s main source of arms since the end of the Cold War, 
and has accounted for 90 per cent of the estimated 165bn renminbi in arms 
sales to China from the states of the former Soviet Union since 1991, accord-
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ing to a Pentagon report from 2004.51 Moscow has sold Beijing advanced 
submarines, fighters, destroyers and missiles as well as strategic aircraft for 
troop movement, air-to-air refuelling and AWACS-type duties. As that the 
EU is unlikely to lift its 1989 arms embargo on China in the near future, and 
the USA is determined not to, Russia seems set to continue as China’s main 
source of arms.  
Economic exigencies made Russian weapons sales to China a necessity in 
the 1990s.52 With Russia’s current record trade and budget surpluses this is 
less the case today.53 Nonetheless, the sale of sensitive technology from 
Russia to China still has considerable potential. Contracts worth billions of 
euros will be available as China pushes to expand its nuclear energy capac-
ity. China plans to quadruple its nuclear output to 16 billion kilowatt-hours 
by 2010, and double that figure again by 2015.54 The Chinese reportedly use 
Russian spacesuits, and Russia provided technical assistance to China in the 
development of the Shenzhou spacecraft, thus helping China become the 
third state to send a human being into space.55  
The simultaneous demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of China fun-
damentally changed the dynamics in China–US relations. Washington 
stopped viewing China as an ally against Moscow, and began to see it as a 
potential rival. The USA is wary of the communist government in Beijing, 
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and many senior actors in the US political landscape, especially among the 
Democrats, are increasingly sceptical of authoritarian trends in Putin’s Rus-
sia. Putin initially built his political image on waging war on the Chechen 
separatists, has reasserted Moscow’s right to appoint regional governors and 
effectively re-nationalised much of the petroleum industry. Beijing, on the 
other hand, is more comfortable with a relatively stable authoritarian Russia 
than the chaos of the 1990s, and feels vindicated in its decision to put down 
the rebellion at Tiananmen Square in 1989.56 The consolidation of what 
Putin calls the ‘power vertical’, i.e. centralisation, has made Moscow a more 
reliable partner for Beijing.57 
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4. Outlook 
Views of separatism and radical Islam 
 
While Chinese Islamic radicals have not gone as far as some of their Russian 
counterparts, Beijing and Moscow have a shared fear of restive minorities 
and independent politicised Islam. Given Beijing’s policy of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states, it has not at any point 
criticised Moscow for its war in Chechnya, and the war is highly unlikely to 
surface as source of bilateral tension. China faces Islamic fundamentalism 
among Uighurs in Xinjiang and Moscow does not feel uncomfortable with 
China’s harsh treatment of these and other minorities, notably the Tibetans. 
The Taiwan issue is not a factor in China–Russia relations, unlike the case 
with China–US or China–EU relations. China and Russia will not criticise 
each other for their records on representative democracy, individual freedom 
or human rights.  
The debate on Kosovo relates to two of the main discourses in both Rus-
sian and Chinese foreign policy: scepticism towards intervention in the af-
fairs of other states, and the rejection of separatism.58 For Russia, negativity 
towards Kosovar independence is further fuelled by an underlying identifica-
tion with Orthodox Christian, post-communist Serbia. Although China lacks 
the Orthodox Christian connection, the anti-interventionist and anti-
separatist doctrines are strong enough to place the China solidly on the Rus-
sian side of the important debate in contemporary diplomacy and interna-
tional relations about whether independence is permissible for Kosovo. 
The significant internal contradictions in Russia’s position on separatism, 
underlined by its simultaneous crackdown on Chechnyan separatists and 
support for separatists in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans-Dniestria,59 
need not worry us unduly here. Although it partially undermines Russian 
credibility on separatism issues in relation to the West, it does not seem to 
pose a problem for the Chinese, and the leaders of the two countries are 
happy to talk almost identically about separatism. 
 
Shared geo-strategic interests 
China and Russia have displayed co-ordinated reluctance to back the West in 
sanctions towards Iran. This illustrates how Moscow and Beijing can realise 
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their national interests more effectively by co-operating in international fo-
rums in a way whereby neither is singled out as an obstacle to Western inter-
ests. China has billions invested in Iran’s oil and gas fields and Iran is the 
source of 11.2 per cent of China’s petroleum imports.60 Russia also has sev-
eral billion dollars of invested in the country and wants to make more by 
reprocessing Iranian reactor fuel. Both sell advanced weapons to Iran. At the 
same time, China has vital security interests in the Middle East and Africa –  
with Iran, Syria and Sudan, among others. Russia also has strong historical 
ties to several Arab states not favoured by Washington, which allows for 
collaboration in areas where few other weighty allies can be found. 
China and Russia have played an active role in the Six-Party Talks on the 
DPRK’s nuclear programme, but both have been reluctant to exert the pres-
sure that Washington would like to see. North Korean nuclear weapons are 
not primarily pointed towards China or Russia, and Beijing and Moscow 
may benefit from the problems that North Korean nuclear weapons cause to 
the US–South Korean alliance and in relations between South Korea and 
Japan.  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the USA established a network of jumping-off 
bases across Central Asia. The ostensible rationale has been the fight against 
terrorism and support for operations in Afghanistan. However, and particu-
larly when coupled with Washington’s rapprochement and strengthened 
military co-operation with India, these developments are often interpreted as 
being motivated by containment of China and especially Russia. China’s 
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, for example, has stated that China ‘would like 
the Americans unequivocally to make clear that they have no intention of 
maintaining a long-term military presence in Central Asia’.61 Moscow’s and 
Beijing’s calls to have the bases closed have succeeded in Uzbekistan, but 
fallen short in Kyrgyzstan. The US presence has a direct impact on the po-
litical processes of the states in the region, and Beijing and Moscow consider 
this a potential threat to their security. As long as Washington maintains a 
presence in Central Asia, Beijing and Moscow are likely to find that they 
have more to gain by uniting in seeking restraint on US power than by seek-
ing mutual confrontation.  
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5. Conclusion: The Strategic Potential  
 
A realist perspective can be employed to understand China–Russia strategic 
convergence. According to both classical and neo-realist theory, a unipolar 
order is inherently unstable, and the emergence of a sole dominant power 
will lead other powers jointly to oppose the hegemon. Hans Morgenthau 
wrote that states are domination-seeking, but that the balance of power leads 
to the restoration of equilibrium.62 Kenneth Waltz argued that the instinct for 
survival in international anarchy ‘stimulates states to behave in ways that 
tend toward the creation of balances of power.’63 Realists essentially pre-
sume that negative feedback is the rule in international politics, and that de-
viation from equilibrium automatically sets in motion countervailing forces 
to re-establish it. Waltz, writing about the USA in the 1990s, argued that 
‘[u]nbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others.’64  
For leaders in Beijing and Moscow, this appears to be true as they have 
watched Washington’s invasion of Iraq and its unrelenting support for Israeli 
policies. In the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
generally remained relatively close to the USA, a behaviour which might be 
described as bandwagoning. Moscow, however, is increasingly disappointed 
with the results of its attempts to stay close to the West. At the same time, 
Western governments increasingly appear to conclude that Russia is unlikely 
to become democratic in the near future, and categorise its regime as having 
more in common with that of China than with for example the Polish case.65  
In this paper we have examined the key factors that bring Russia and 
China together. The two states have complementary economies, shared con-
cerns about US power, fear of more Orange/Rose/Tulip revolutions, and 
common interests in the Middle East and Africa. There are, however, several 
significant obstacles to closer co-operation between Russia and China. The 
most significant weakness in the relationship lies in Russia’s concern over 
China’s dominance, particularly in connection with Siberia, which it is 
feared could fall victim to Chinese expansion – Manchuria in reverse.66 The 
population of the Russian Far East has tumbled even faster than that in the 
rest of Russia, from 8 million inhabitants in 1991 to about 6.5 million in 
2006, or slightly more than one person per square kilometre.67  The Russian 
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government is considering a range of re-population programmes to avoid the 
forecasted drop to 4.5 million people by 2015.68 By contrast, the three bor-
dering Chinese provinces contain more than 107 million inhabitants.69 Rus-
sia is wary of Chinese migration and economic dominance in Siberia, which 
was illustrated when China was awarded shares worth just USD 500 million 
in Rosneft’s IPO in 2006, having reportedly sought USD 3bn. This was less 
than BP (USD 1bn) and Petronas (USD 1.1bn) were awarded.70 In 1997 
Menon pointed to difficulties in Sino–Russo relations due to the reluctance 
of regional elites to work with the Chinese.71 This issue has been partly 
solved as Moscow has reasserted power over its regions, but the underlying 
fear of the ‘yellow peril’ lingers.72 
China and Russia are unfinished international actors: Russia because it is 
still in the process of redefining its post-Cold War identity and reasserting 
state control; and China because it is industrialising, urbanising, growing 
rapidly and opening to the outside world. Russia is taking important lessons 
from China about the assertion of state control in strategic sectors of the 
economy, which in turn signals compatibility of methods and shared world-
views.  
Institutionalisation of the Beijing–Moscow relationship remains low, but 
a pattern of regular consultation between top leaders has evolved. Russia and 
China also meet annually for bilateral military and technical co-operation 
talks, and have continued to develop the Shanghai Co-operation Organisa-
tion founded in 2001. China–Russia strategic convergence is a discernible 
trend which will gain further momentum. However, strategic convergence 
should not be confused with an alliance, and China and Russia are not per-
fect strategic partners. Developments inside China and Russia are crucial to 
how the relationship develops. Key questions are whether political stability 
will prevail and whether rapid growth can be sustained. 
Trenin argues that a Sino–Russian alliance could occur only as a result of 
‘exceptionally short-sighted and foolish policies on Washington’s part.’73 
China and Russia are not pro-Western, but neither are they definitively anti-
Western. Western policymakers who are worried about the implications of 
Sino–Russian strategic convergence would do well to pursue a policy of en-
gaging both Moscow and Beijing, and put pressure on Tokyo to resolve the 
dispute over the Kurile Islands. 
Paradoxically, if an alliance, or something resembling an alliance, were 
to be formed this could lead to a breakdown of the relationship in the me-
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dium to long term. China and Russia both command sufficient resources and 
sophistication to be significant global powers in their own right, and they 
certainly consider themselves as such. China was unwilling to subordinate 
itself to Russia for more than a brief period after the Communists came to 
power in 1949, and Russia would refuse to subordinate itself to China.  
The most likely scenario is Sino–Russo strategic convergence based on a 
relationship of mutual self-interest. The evidence presented in this paper in-
dicates that trade and investment between China and Russia are set to con-
tinue to grow rapidly, particularly in the energy sector, further enhancing the 
significance of the relationship.  While Beijing and Moscow have common 
interests in placing restraints on the power of the United States, the creation 
of a full-fledged anti-Western alliance is unlikely to prove viable in the short 
term. Russia and especially China are both dependent on open access to 
Western markets to sustain growth.  
The realist prediction that unbalanced power is inherently unstable, and 
the emergence of a sole dominant power will lead other powers jointly to 
oppose the hegemon, cannot be confirmed. However, if Beijing and Moscow 
find that the US hegemon does not allow them the space they need as they 
re-emerge as world powers, they will have strong incentives to deepen their 
mutual strategic ties. If Washington were genuinely committed to allowing 
the concurrent rise of China and Russia as world powers, despite their inher-
ent challenge to Washington’s own power, China and Russia would have 
limited incentives to co-operate, and mutual fear would be the overriding 
feature in the relationship. Both would seek to work closely with Japan, as a 
counterweight to the other’s power. However, the USA has been unable to 
provide China and Russia with the reassurance they would like, and they 
may be in the process of turning to each other for collaboration.  
The development of China–Russia strategic convergence does not neces-
sarily mean that China and Russia are turning their backs on the West, but 
does it represent a challenge to US hegemony and could change the world 
order. The year 2008 will be decisive, with presidential elections in both 
Russia and USA in which neither of the incumbents can legally participate. 
The same year, the pipeline from Russia to China is set for completion. One 
scenario is that the US–Russia relationship could deteriorate rapidly in the 
wake of the Russian presidential election if a member of the Petersburg rul-
ing circle is anointed new president, the result is legitimised in a national 
election, and Washington subsequently deems the election to have been nei-
ther free nor fair.74 The resulting tension between Russia and the USA could 
drive Russia into the embrace of China. Alternatively, fresh presidential 
faces on both sides of the Atlantic could spell renewed co-operation between 
Russia and the USA, lessening the significance of the Russia–China axis. 
The Beijing Olympics will also take place in 2008, and are set to be China’s 
coming-out party. Zhongnanhai will do everything it can to avoid confronta-
tion with the West, but at the same time it welcomes close ties with Russia.  
To prevent the international system from recidivism into destabilising 
great-power rivalry, the USA and Europe must seek to manage a precarious 
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and multifaceted balance: on the one hand, pushing Russia and China to re-
form, whilst acknowledging that pushing too hard could lead to alienation, 
and allowing Russia and China to rise whilst managing and integrating their 
power. 
 
 
 
